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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL STUDY
PERSONNEL SECURITY: DIA

1)   Procedures and Timeframes

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) attempts to bring most staff on board at the secret level, provided they can be used at that security level pending a final higher clearance. DIA's requirements are usually for SBIs and periodic reinvestigations (PRs).

The Defense Investigative Service does DIA's investigations. DIA adheres to Director of Central Intelligence Directive Number 1/14 and DOD 5200.2-R, which are the primary national and DOD directives on personnel security. DIA's own regulation on personnel security, DIAR 50-8, is undergoing a major revision, and DIA has told NAPA it is "not in a form suitable for outside review."

DIA sends its adjudicators to CIA and OPM courses so that they apply the DCID 1/14 criteria as uniformly as possible.

Security processing times vary with the security background of the person being investigated (i.e. prior investigative and clearance history) and the security clearance required as of the day the person will enter on duty at DIA.

The Office of Security (OS-3) periodically conducts random, statistical surveys to determine security processing times, as measured in calendar days between the date the DIA Personnel Directorate (RHR) sends the letter of nomination to OS-3 and the date OS-3 sends a security determination back to RHR. OS-3 uses the median number of calendar days to measure the security acceptance turnaround times. Two recent random surveys showed 54 days and 59 days for median turnaround times during fiscal years 1985, 1986 and 1987.

The bulk of security processing time is file acquisition (for those with prior investigations) and investigation time (where prior investigation files do not exist). DIA case control and adjudication times were seven work days in fiscal year 1985, six in fiscal year 1986, and eight in fiscal year 1987.

2)   Impact of Security Investigation on Agency Selection Process

DIA was unable to provide statistics, but security staff estimate that most applicants whose processing is terminated by the personnel office dropped out because they lost interest. Security staff do not believe they drop out because they are worried about security processing.

3)   Extent of Impact of Security Process on Lifestyle/Family Issues

This type of data is not maintained by DIA.

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4)   Impact of Involuntary Staff Separations on Agency Security

While DIA does not have statistics on its own staff who are removed for cause, there is data that includes denial/revocation information for DIA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Agencies (less NSA). For all of these entities:

Fiscal Year	Denials	Revocations
1986	104	14
1987	78	4

DIA Regulation 54-4 says that, because of DIA's sensitive mission, the Assistant Deputy Director for Security Services (RSS) will assess the possible security impact of any action taken to terminate the employment or assignment of any DIA staff member for cause. Staff may not even initiate such an action without prior coordination with the RSS.

If, after assessing the situation, the RSS believes removal would threaten the security of DIA's mission, the RSS will advise the DIA unit involved to postpone adverse action until the Command Element reviews the security implications of the situation.

There are 'extremely limited' opportunities for extended employment at a low or no level of clearance. DIA will sometimes put someone into a less sensitive position for six months to a year -- sort of a cooling off period. At the end of that period, the sensitive data to which they had access will have been desensitized, and the person can be removed.

5)   Views on the Polygraph as a Security Tool

DIA began an in-house polygraph capability in July 1987, predominantly to support Counterintelligence Scope Security Polygraph needs under the congressionally approved DOD Polygraph Test Programs. DIA adheres strictly to the CI scope (non-lifestyle) format, and administers the examinations on an "aperiodic basis" to on-board employees.

Pre-employment examinations will be considered when the program is fully staffed and there is appropriate polygraph space. DIA considers the CI scope polygraphy examination to be a very important adjunct to its security program. DIA staff have accepted this program overwhelmingly favorably.

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6)   NAPA Staff Views

     DIA is considering using the polygraph for all applicants, but
will not make this decision until they have more trained staff and
appropriate space. The NAPA panel will want to consider DIA
policies in this area in conjunction with any IC-wide
recommendations. DIA does not have an outplacement program for
those whose SCI access is revoked, and may want to consider this.

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